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Extant literature on FDI entry modes and corruption tend to convey the idea that corruption 
leads to the choice of low equity, i.e. joint-ventures with local partners, or non-equity modes, 
namely  export  and  contracting,  in  order  to  avoid  the  contact  with  corrupt  state  officials. 
Recently, some studies argument that despite corruption, linguistic and historical ties between 
home and host countries guide MNCs to prefer high equity modes.  Focusing on  a rather 
unexplored setting, the African countries, most specifically the PALOP (Países Africanos de 
Língua  Oficial  Portuguesa),  which  includes  countries  with  both  very  high  (e.g.,  Guinea-
Bissau, and Angola), high (e.g., Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe) and middle (e.g., Cape 
Verde) levels of corruption, and that maintain quite close linguistic and historical ties with 
Portugal, we found that FDI entry mode is associated to the less corrupt markets. Thus, our 
results do not support the content that cultural and historical links are likely to perform an 
intermediating role in helping, through fostering foreign direct investment, African countries 
to overpass the dismissal growth that some have been  facing in the last decades. On the 
contrary, our findings highlight the pressing need for these countries to combat corruption if 
higher economic growth via FDI attraction is envisioned. 
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1.  Introduction 
Multinational  companies  (MNCs)  are  increasingly  influenced  by  institutional  instability, 
perceived  risk  and  uncertainty  in  their  process  of  investing  in  emerging  economies 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Extant literature suggests the existence of a negative correlation 
between  inflows  of  FDI  and  corruption  (Uhlenbruck  et  al.,  2006;  Javorcik  et  al.,  2009). 
Specifically, the analysis is centered on quantifying FDI flows and to assess how firms adapt 
their entry mode to existing corruption (Straub, 2007).  
In  such  contexts,  evidence  is  found  that  firms  prefer  joint-ventures  to  wholly  owned 
subsidiaries (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Straub, 2007; Javorcik et al., 
2009; Demirbag et al., 2010). Regardless whether firms face petty bureaucratic or high-level 
political  corruption  (Straub,  2007),  and  the  level  of  pervasiveness  and  arbitrariness  of 
corruption (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Demirbag et al., 2010), existing 
empirical studies suggest that corruption influences the entry mode, particularly towards the 
choice of non-equity modes or partnering. More recently, however, some evidence was found 
that  in  case  of  positive  relationships  between  home  and  host  country  MNCs  revealed 
preference for wholly owned subsidiaries (Demirbag et al., 2010).  
It is important to underline that these studies that analyze the relationship between corruption 
and its impact on MNCs’ choice of entry mode focused mainly on Eastern Europe (Javorcik et 
al., 2009) and Asia (Demirbag et al., 2010) or took a general overview based on a cross-
country composition (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Straub, 2007). Similar analyses encompassing 
African countries have been rather neglected in this regard.  
Among African countries, a sub-set of countries, the PALOP (Países Africanos de Língua 
Oficial Portuguesa), includes countries with both very low (e.g., Guinea-Bissau, and Angola), 
low (e.g., Mozambique, São Tome and Principe) and middle (e.g., Cape Verde) levels of 
transparency as perceived by the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 
2009). Given the close relationship ties between Portugal and the PALOP based on linguistic 
and  historical  factors,  and  following  Demirbag  et  al.’s  (2010)  argument,  it  would  be 
scientifically pertinent to analyze the extent to which PALOP’s corruption levels influence the 
entry modes of Portuguese MNCs in these countries.  
The empirical analysis undertaken in the present study aims therefore to assess the extent to 
which Portuguese MNCs’ entry modes in PALOPs corroborates Demirbag’s (2010) thesis.  
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Moreover, it contributes to the scarce literature on corruption and MNCs’ entry models by 
analyzing an under explored context, the PALOP.  
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we revise existent literature on theories and 
determinants of MNCs’ entry modes and on corruption, deepening the analysis of existent 
articles about the impact of corruption on MNCs’ entry mode. In Section 3 we detail the 
methodological considerations of the study: data gathering procedures, questionnaire, target 
firms (Portuguese firms that internationalized to the PALOPs), and the specification of the 
econometric model which will permit to quantify the net impact of corruption on entry mode 
choice.  In  Section  4  results  of  the  econometric  estimations  are  discussed  and,  finally,  in 
Conclusions we summarize the main points of the research. 
2. Corruption and MNCs’ Entry Modes. Literature Review1 
2.1. Defining Corruption  
Being one of the most widespread political problems worldwide (Frischmann, 2010), in recent 
years there has been considerable empirical research on the causes and effects of corruption 
(Goel et al., 2010). The World Bank has estimated that more than 1 trillion USD is paid in 
bribes each year and that countries that fight corruption, improve governance and the rule of 
law, what could increase per capita incomes by 400 percent (Dreher et al., 2007).  
According to the significant impact and the numerous studies on corruption, there are lots of 
definitions of this phenomenon (Detzer, 2010). The most common is the one used by the 
World  Bank,  describing  corruption  as  “the  abuse  of  public  office  for  private  gain”.
2 
Transparency  International  has  a  very  similar  designation,  defining  it  as  “the  misuse  of 
entrusted power for private gain”.
3 Another often cited, but less clear and focused definition is 
corruption as the “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of 
private  regarding  […]  pecuniary  or  status  gains,  or  violates  rules  against  the  exercise  of 
certain types of private regarding influence” (Nye, 1989: 966 in Frischmann, 2010: 2).  
These definitions may differ slightly in their formulation, nevertheless there is consensus in 
lots of studies (Dey, 1989; Mauro, 1998; Treisman, 1998; Dietrich, 2010; Reiter et al., 2010) 
                                                 
1 This section is based on a deeper and more detailed survey by Grande and Teixeira (2011). 
2 “Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank”, in. 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm, accessed on 20
th November 2010.  
3 “How do you define corruption?”, in http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq, accessed on 
20
th November 2010.  
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that corruption refers to acts in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a 
manner that contravenes the rules of the game (Jain, 2002).  
Another  issue  arising  in  the  analysis  of  corruption  is  the  question  how  to  measure  this 
occurrence. The most well-known corruption indicator is the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI), published annually by Transparency International (Berg, 2001).  
Another  method  for  constructing  composite  indicators  of  corruption  is  given  by  the 
International  Country  Risk  Guide  (ICRG)  (Mauro,  1998;  Dietrich,  2010).  Alternatively, 
Demirbag et al. (2010), who focus on the specific type of corruption, bribery, use the bribe 
ratio to measure this behavior. In studies like this the measurement is used as a representative 
indicator for corruption (Henderson, 2010) or, more precisely, the pervasiveness of corruption 
(Demirbag et al., 2010). 
Besides the mentioned methods of measuring corruption, there is a diversity of corruption and 
bribery  indexes  elaborated  from  different  entities  such  as  the  World  Economic  Forum 
(Friedman et al., 2000), the International Monetary Fund (García et al., 2009) and the World 
Bank (Javorcik et al., 2009).  
2.2. MNCs entry modes 
2.2.1. Defining MNCs entry modes 
International  entry  modes  represent  the  third  most  researched  field  in  international 
management, being directly related to MNC’s international activity (Canabal et al., 2008). 
Entry modes vary largely in its scale of entry (Peng, 2009), being mostly divided into two 
categories: equity and non-equity (Tian, 2007).  
Equity  entry  modes  include  joint-ventures  and  wholly-owned  subsidiaries.  The  former 
consists in a sharing arrangement between a foreign MNC and a local firm, where resources, 
risk and operational control are divided between the partners (Julian, 2005), whereas the latter 
might  involve  both  greenfield  investments  that  consists  in  establishing  a  new  firm  and 
acquisitions of already existing firms (Razin, 2007). In the case of equity mode the resource 
commitment, i.e. the scale of entry, is very high because there is a direct establishment in the 
foreign market (Hill et al., 2009).  
Non-equity modes are exports and contractual agreements like licensing, franchising, turnkey 
projects and R&D contracts. In this case the scale of entry is lower because the relations with 
the foreign market do not imply a direct establishment (Peng, 2009).   
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2.2.2. Main theoretical approaches and determinants of MNCs entry modes  
It is important to recall that most of theories on FDI and MNCs intent to explain why firms 
involved themselves in several types of internationalization processes. In general, the very 
distinct theoretical approaches (early studies FDI; the neoclassical trade theory; ownership 
advantages;  aggregate  variables;  ownership,  location  and  internalization  advantage  (OLI) 
framework;  horizontal  and  vertical  FDI;  the  knowledge-capital  model;  risk  diversification 
models;  and  policy  variables  –  cf.  Faeth,  2009),  are  not  directly  and  explicitly  aimed  at 
explaining MNCs’ entry modes but instead their focus is on highlighting key determinants of 
foreign  direct  investment.  By  adapting  the  existing  theoretical  approaches  on  FDI  and 
internationalization,  we  provide  a  distinct  systematization,  mixing  existing  contributions 
under the transaction cost analysis, the broader theoretical framework, the Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm, and the institutional approach. 
Transaction cost analysis has been widely used by researchers to examine determinants of 
entry mode choices (Chen et al., 2002). Most theorists who study this cost-related approach 
favor the establishment of joint-ventures (Madok, 1998), because it reduces significantly the 
high financial efforts related to other entry modes(Raff et al., 2009) and helps to fill the 
information gap due to socio-cultural differences (Chun, 2009).  
Starting  from  the  micro-level,  of  Dunning’s  eclectic  paradigm  the  ownership  dimension 
highlights  firm-level  determinants  such  as  income-generating  assets  and  firms’  ability  to 
coordinate them with other assets abroad (Cantwell, 2003). Given the perspective on firms’ 
abilities, we might associate the firm’s competences, skills and assets from the resource-based 
theory (Hill, 2009) to this approach (Luo, 1999). In concrete, for firm-specific assets (Madok, 
1998; Sreenivas et al., 2000) such as technology intense resources (Sun, 1999; Javorcik et al., 
2009) and inventive/R&D intense activities (Bhaumik et al., 2005; Chung, 2009), the mostly 
preferred  entry  mode  is  the  establishment  of  wholly-owned  subsidiaries  (WOS).  This  is 
justified on the basis that firm-specific resources and activities need a high level of control 
(Edwards et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2002), which would not be possible in a joint-venture (JV) 
where knowledge has to be transferred to the partner (Chiao et al., 2010; Yiu et al., 2002; 
Martin et al., 2003). MNCs with cumulated knowledge in internationalization are less likely 
to rely on the support of a joint-venture partner, because they already have the needed know-
how to do business abroad (Mutinelli et al., 1998). In contrast, when a MNC does not have 
any  experience,  JV  can be  used  to  complement  internal  R&D  resources  and  to  exchange 
knowledge on an interfirm basis level (Mutinelli et al., 1998).   
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The internalization approach from Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm stems from the removal of 
the market relationship between an importer and an exporter, which provokes high transaction 
costs for the internationalized MNC (Peng, 2009). This theory is based on the advantages that 
are  created  when  a  MNC  enters  foreign  markets  via  FDI,  avoiding  entry  costs  and  trade 
barriers (Cantwell, 2005) (see Transaction Cost Approach). 
In  the  location-specific  approach  extracted  from  Dunning’s  Eclectic  Paradigm,  cultural 
distance is a dominant determinant of entry mode choice. Culturally distant markets favor 
MNCs entry via WOS, rather than by JV (Chen et al., 2002; Pennings et al., 2004; Drogendijk 
et  al.,  2006).  Also  high  potential  industries  (Chen  et  al.,  2002)  and  competition  intense 
markets (Elango et al., 2004; Müller, 2007), guide MNCs to choose WOS as the optimal entry 
mode.  Nevertheless,  to  gain  access  to  industry-specific  assets  such  as  R&D  capabilities 
(Belderbos,  2003)  and  complementary  assets  (Hennart,  2009)  MNCs  use  joint-venture 
partners as intermediaries to guarantee their availability.  
Preference for JV establishments exists for intense socio-cultural differences between home 
and  host  countries  (Sun,  1999;  Chun,  2009).  Linguistic  distance  (Demirbag  et  al.,  2009) 
influences entry modes in the same direction; specifically, MNCs overcome such “cultural 
barriers”  through  the  support  of  local  JV  partners  (Sun,  1999).  These  partners  are  often 
embedded in local networks which are advantageous for foreign MNCs’ performance (Yeung 
et al., 2000). FDI, in general, is preferred when entering large markets (Horstmann et al., 
1996; Eicher et al., 2005) and when countries have low development levels (Lehner, 2009; 
Al-Kaabi et al., 2010). 
Focusing now on the more macro level approaches, namely the institutional approach, the 
determinants of firms’ entry mode include items such as political risk (Henisz, 2000; Ketata, 
2006), perceived uncertainty due to risky environments (Taylor et al., 2000; Ahmed et al., 
2002; Li et al., 2007) and institutional differences (Luo, 2001; Chiao et al., 2010). In these 
cases  the  preferable  entry  mode  choice  is  WOS.  One  reason  of  this  choice  may  be  the 
protection  from  manipulative  JV  partners,  whose  knowledge  about  the  institutional 
environment  is  more  detailed  than  that  of  foreign  investors  (Henisz,  2000).  JV  can  also 
function as a protection from governmental intervention (Luo, 2001) and political constraints 
oriented to foreign firms (Yiu et al., 2002; Demirbag et al., 2009). Facing corruption, JV 
would help to avoid excessive transaction costs related to corruptive government officials 
(Javorcik et al., 2009), can minimize the lack of familiarity with host countries’ institutions  
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(Meyer, 2001) and decrease uncertainty due to political differences (Bianchi et al., 2006; 
Slangen et al., 2008). 
Other authors argue that entry into corruptive host countries should be based on non-equity 
modes  (Rodriguez  et  al.,  2005;  Straub,  2007),  such  as  export  and  contracting  (licensing, 
franchising  and  turnkey  projects),  to  protect  foreign  investors  from  eventually  corruptive 
joint-venture partners (Slangen et al., 2009). 
Summarizing the contributions reviewed above and framing them into main trends of entry 
mode choices we can state that there is a main inclination for equity mode choice when taking 
into account the Eclectic Paradigm theory, whereas the non equity mode choices are more in 
line with the institutional approach. This is in part explained by the fact that institutional 
theory focuses mainly on constraining determinants while the Eclectic Paradigm highlights 
the benefits of MNCs’ internationalization. 
2.3. Corruption and MNCs’ entry modes 
The few studies that simultaneously focus on corruption and entry modes (e.g., Uhlenbruck et 
al., 2006; Straub, 2007; Paul et al., 2008; García et al., 2009; Javorcik et al., 2009; Slangen et 
al., 2009; Demirbag et al., 2010) permits the observation that there is a diversity of measures 
utilized  in  order  to  quantify  corruption  and  a  variety  of  analyzed  entry  modes.  Indeed, 
corruption is rarely defined and measured the same way.  
Demirbag  et  al.  (2010:  214),  analyzing  the  pervasiveness  of  corruption  defined  as  “the 
average  firm’s  likelihood  of  encountering  corruption  in  its  normal  interactions  with  state 
officials”, quantifies bribes with Transparency International’s bribe payers index (BPI). Other 
authors  like  Javorcik  et  al.  (2009)  and  Slangen  et  al.  (2009)  use  a  junction  of  several 
indicators. In concrete, Javorcik et al. (2009) employ the corruption index from the World 
Development Report, which is based on a survey undertaken by the World Bank, completing 
it with the corruption index used in Kaufmann et al. (1999) and a corruption perception index 
reached by a questionnaire made by the German journalist, Peter Neumann. This, according to 
Javorcik  et  al.  (2009),  provides  more  precise  results  concerning  to  different  types  of 
corruption.  Slangen  et  al.  (2009)  measure  corruption  through  Kaufmann  et  al.’s  (2004) 
analysis of several hundreds of variables measuring governance quality. Also García et al. 
(2009) merge the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) with the International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF)  indices  to  include  corruption  (measured  by  the  CPI)  as  well  as  political  stability 
(considered  by  the  IMF)  in  their  study.  Straub  (2007)  does  not  diversify  the  sources  of  
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corruption’s measurement, but includes different indexes of the International Country Risk 
Guide (corruption index and index of bureaucratic quality) in order to distinguish between 
bureaucratic and political corruption in his analysis.  
According to the entry modes studied in these articles we observe that there are two main 
groups. On the one side, we have the analysis of WOS versus JV (Javorcik et al., 2009; 
Slangen et al., 2009; Demirbag et al., 2010) and, on the other side, studies focusing on FDI 
(WOS and JV) versus non-equity modes (e.g., Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 
2006; Straub, 2007; Paul et al., 2008).  
A general observation regarding each of the analyzed articles demonstrates that corruption 
discourages the establishment of wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS). Nevertheless, in specific 
cases  like  large-sized  operations,  cultural  proximity  (Demirbag  et  al.,  2010)  and  high-
technological firms (Javorcik et al., 2009) MNCs may enter via WOS in order to protect their 
firm-specific  assets  from  for  example  joint-venture  partners  or  because  the  cultural 
environment is very similar to the home countries. Rodriguez et al. (2005) also purposes this 
entry mode in presence of pervasive corruption that can encourage MNCs’ involvement in 
corruption to achieve legitimacy but, at the same times, might cause internal conflicts within 
MNCs  internal  norms.  In  this  sense  the  articles  which  oppose  wholly-owned  subsidiaries 
(WOS) to joint-ventures (JV) consider this second option as advisable being a strategic mean 
for integration in social networks and to enforce MNC’s external legitimacy (Demirbag et al., 
2010) and to avoid excessive transaction costs (Javorcik et al., 2009). According to Slangen et 
al.  (2009)  this  option  may  protect  MNCs  from  external  uncertainties  but  creates  internal 
uncertainties originated by the local partner.  
Regarding  the  articles  which  analyzed  the  opposition  FDI  versus  non-equity  modes,  the 
establishment of a JV appears as a viable option in case of arbitrary corruption in order to 
protect  themselves  from  discriminating policies  towards  foreign  firms  (Uhlenbruck et  al., 
2006), to avoid direct contact with corrupt government officials and to achieve legitimacy via 
networking (Rodriguez et al., 2005). The third and dominant option of these studies consists 
in  entering  corrupt  markets  via  non-equity  modes.  According  to  Straub  (2007),  petty 
bureaucratic corruption causes a shift towards non-equity modes because firms try to avoid 
bribes related to ownership and high-political corruption also favors this entry mode in order 
to preserve asymmetric information. Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) and Rodriguez et al. (2005) 
argue  that  in  presence  of  pervasiveness,  even  when  combined  with  arbitrariness,  MNCs 
choose non-equity modes to avoid the costs related to corruption. Using Paul et al.’s (2008)  
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arguments we can affirm that when the host country exhibits greater progress towards market-
oriented reforms and being highly liberalized, MNCs tend to enter via high equity modes, but 
in more risky environments it is advisable to enter via contracting, or generally via non-equity 
modes such as exports, franchising or licensing. 
Multinational  companies  (MNCs)  are  increasingly  influenced  by  institutional  instability, 
perceived  risk  and  uncertainty  in  their  process  of  investing  in  emerging  economies 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Extant literature suggests the existence of a negative correlation 
between  inflows  of  FDI  and  corruption  (Uhlenbruck  et  al.,  2006;  Javorcik  et  al.,  2009). 
Specifically, the analysis is centered on quantifying FDI flows and to assess how firms adapt 
their entry mode to existing corruption (Straub, 2007).  
In  such  contexts,  evidence  is  found  that  firms  prefer  joint-ventures  to  wholly  owned 
subsidiaries (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Straub, 2007; Javorcik et al., 
2009; Demirbag et al., 2010). Regardless whether firms face petty bureaucratic or high-level 
political  corruption  (Straub,  2007),  and  the  level  of  pervasiveness  and  arbitrariness  of 
corruption (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Demirbag et al., 2010), existing 
empirical studies suggest that corruption influences the entry mode, particularly towards the 
choice of non-equity modes or partnering. More recently, however, some evidence was found 
that  in  case  of  positive  relationships  between  home  and  host  country  MNCs  revealed 
preference for wholly owned subsidiaries (Demirbag et al., 2010).  
Most of the studies that analyze the relationship between corruption and its impact on MNCs’ 
choice of entry mode focused mainly on Eastern Europe (Javorcik et al., 2009) and Asia 
(Demirbag et al., 2010), or took a general overview based on a cross-country composition 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Straub, 2007). Similar analyses encompassing African countries are, 
to the best of our knowledge, non existent.  
Given  the  well  known  historical  and  linguistic  proximity  that  some  group  of  African 
countries,  the  PALOP  (Países  Africanos  de  Língua  Oficial  Portuguesa),  maintains  with 
Portugal (Lloyd-Jones and Pinto, 2003), and the fact that the levels of transparency are in this 
group  (with  the  exception  of  Cape  Verde)  quite  worrisome,  reflecting  a  high  degree  and 
widespread corruption,
4 it would be scientifically pertinent to analyze the extent to which 
                                                 
4 Among 178 countries, Angola ranks 168
th, with a score of 1.9, Guinea Bissau 154
th, with 2.1, Mozambique 
118
th with 2.7, and Sao Tome Principe 101
st with 3.0 in the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index. Note that the 
score ranks from 10 (very clean) down to 0 (highly corrupt), being considered that countries with a score equal 
or inferior to 3.0 suffer from pervasive and widespread corruption (Transparency International, 2011).  
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PALOP’s corruption levels influence the entry modes of Portuguese MNCs in these countries. 
More specifically, given the traits of the countries in analysis we can test Demirbag et al.’s 
(2010) argument in a new set of countries, the African ones, most notably the PALOP. 
Thus, we would expect that despite the widespread levels of corruption, which according to 
the extant literature would advice MNCs to follow a non equity entry mode (namely export, 
contracting), given the historical and linguistic proximity between Portugal and the PALOP, 
Portuguese MNCs entry mode might occur preferably through equity modes (FDI). 
3. Methodological considerations 
Similarly to other studies, which analyze the role of the several determinants on MNCs’ entry 
mode options (e.g., Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Straub, 2007; Slangen et al., 2009), the present 
study resorts to a multivariate econometric model, more specifically, a logistic regression to 
assess how corruption affects firms’ entry modes in countries characterized by widespread 
levels of corruption (the PALOPs) and that maintains historical and language affinities with 
the MNCs’ home country (Portugal).  
Based  on  the  literature,  MNCs  entry  mode  choices  depend  on  four  main  groups  of 
determinants,  namely  on  the  three  dimensions  of  Dunning’s  Eclectic  Paradigm  (or  OLI 
model) and the institutional approach. We left out the Transaction Cost Approach because, as 
earlier noted, its determinants are included in the internalization dimension of the OLI model.  
Our ‘dependent’ variable, MNC entry mode, is a dummy which assumes the value 1 in the 
case the firm chooses (for a given market) to entry through FDI and 0 otherwise (non equity 
modes). 
Given the nature of the dependent variable (binary), the empirical assessment of MNCs FDI 
propensity is based on the estimation of the general logistic regression, which in turn is based 
on the existing literature on the determinants of entry modes, surveyed in Section 2. In order 
to have a more straightforward interpretation of the logistic coefficients, it is convenient to 
consider a rearrangement of the equation for the logistic model, in which it is rewritten in 
terms of the odds of an event occurring. Writing the logistic model in terms of the log odds, 
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The logistic coefficient can be interpreted as the change in the log odds associated with a one-
unit change in the independent variable. Then, e raised to the power βi is the factor by which 
the odds change when the i
th independent variable increases by one unit. If βi is positive, this 
factor will be greater than 1, which means that the odds are increased; if βi is negative, the 
factor will be less than one, which means that the odds are decreased. When βi is 0, the factor 
equals 1, which leaves the odds unchanged. In the case where the estimate of β9 emerges as 
positive and significant for the conventional levels of statistical significance (that is, 1%, 5% 
or 10%), this means that, on average, all other factors remaining constant, the ‘preferable’ 
entry mode by Portuguese MNCs in countries/markets with higher perceived corruption levels 
is FDI, which would go in line with Demirbag et al.’s (2010) argumentation.  
The descriptive statistics of the variables model and the matrix of correlations are presented in 
Table 1. The estimates of the βs are given in Table 2. 
Our unit of analysis is not the firm or the market but instead the firm and the market – the 
same firm can internationalize for one single country or for all the (5) countries (Angola, 
Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Sao Tome Principe) in analysis.  
The population surveyed was all (562) Portuguese firms that, according to AICEP Portugal 
Global,  a  government  business  entity,  which  focuses  on  FDI  and  the  promotion  of  the 
internationalization  processes  of  Portuguese  companies,  internationalize  for  the  5  PALOP 
countries.
5  
We construct and implement a direct email questionnaire to all the firms which beside firms 
main characteristics it included questions regarding firms’ entry modes in each of the market 
in  analysis  (in  the  event  they  had  in  fact  entry)  and  their  perceptions  about  some  key 
institutional factors (specifically, the importance of legal restrictions, linguistic and historical 
proximity, and corruption perception in the choice of the entry mode). 
                                                 
5 The original database had 653 firms but 46 firms claim not having any presence in PALOP and in 45 cases de 




Around ¼ of the surveyed firms answer the questionnaire and, considering that 65% of them 
internationalize for more than one PALOP country, it resulted the gathering of 321 valid 
observations.  
Descriptive  results  (cf.  Table  1)  based  on  the  sample  in  analysis  convey  that  Portuguese 
MNCs’  ‘propensity’  for  FDI  as  a  ‘preferable’  entry  mode  in  PALOP  is  positively  and 
significantly  related  to  firm  size  and  the  importance  attributed  to  legal  restrictions  and 
political  stability.  That  is,  in  a  bivariate  statistical  analysis,  larger  MNCs  and  those  that 
perceive  legal  restrictions  and political  stability  as  key  factors  when  choosing  their  entry 
mode, tend on average to opt for equity based entry mode (i.e., FDI) in alternative to export 
and/or contracting. In contrast, firms that present higher international experience as measured 
by the number of countries to whom they internationalize or the years that passed since they 
first internationalize, tend to opt for non-equity entry modes, namely export. 
Regarding  the  relation  between  the  independent  variables,  results  evidence  that  years  of 
experience in internationalization and number of countries to which the firm internationalize 
are positively and significantly related revealing that firms that internationalize for a larger 
number of countries tend to have started their internationalization processes longer time ago. 
Given this high correlation it is advisable to estimate the ‘theoretical’ model using one of the 
two proxies of internationalization experience. Thus, we estimate Model I (cf. Table 2) using 
‘number  of  countries  in  which  the  firm  is  present’  as  the  proxy  for  internationalization 
experience whereas in Model II we use ‘number years experience in internationalization’. 
Although some correlations between the independent variables are strong (namely, between 
the corruption perception index and the openness indicator) these are not high enough to 
undermine the estimation of the proposed model.   
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Table 1: Correlation matrix 








FDI vs Exports (1=FDI)  0.262  0.440  1                               
2. R&D 
intensity  R&D to sales ratio  0.104  0.194  0.031  1                            
3. Firm’s 
size  Number of employees (ln)  3.887  1.556  0.094
*  -0.157
*  1                         
Number years experience in 
internationalization (ln)  2.208  0.971  -0.111
**  -0.066  0.456
***  1                       4. 
International 
experience  Number of countries in which 
the firm is present (ln)  2.055  1.060  -0.273
**  -0.060  0.491
***  0.482
***  1                   
5. Openness 
of the host 
economy 
(Exports+Imports)/GDP (ln)  -0.099  0.233  0.071  0.027  -0.081  -0.062  -0.148
***  1                
6. Host 
market size  GDP per capita  6.629  0.734  0.022  -0.037  -0.082  -0.062  -0.120
**  0.340
***  1             
7. Cultural 
proximity 
Proportion of firms that stated 
that linguistic and historical 
ties between home and host 
country were important or 
very important in the decision 
to enter the market 
0.875  0.331  0.031  0.020  -0.101  -0.033  -0.051  -0.05  -0.026  1          
8. Legal 
Restrictions 
Proportion of firms that stated 
that the entry mode choice 
was quite influenced by legal 
restrictions in the country 
0.268  0.444  0.136
**  -0.106
*  -0.078  -0.097
*  -0.037  0.015  0.047  0.122
**  1       
9. Political 
stability  
Governance Quality - 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 
0.648  0.478  0.127
**  -0.077  -0.078  -0.053  -0.100
*  -0.005  0.055  0.196
***  0.313
***  1    
10. 
Corruption 
Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) (ln)  0.998  0.360  -0.043  -0.051  0.024  0.017  0.061  -0.427
***  0.323




*] statistically significant at 1%(5%)[10%]; N=321=no. of firms (144)*no. of markets.  
 
14 
4. Econometric results 
According to the goodness of fit measures (Hosmer and Lameshow test and % corrected), the 
two estimated models represent the ‘reality’ quite well. 
As expected, larger and more innovative Portuguese MNCs tend, on average, ceteris paribus, 
to choose FDI as their preferable entry mode in PALOP. In this sense we corroborate 
Demirbag et al.’s (2010) finding that the larger the number of employees (in its case proxy for 
the size of operation) the more likely is the foreign investor to choose an equity entry mode. 
Also supported by our empirical results are the findings of Sun (1999), Chung (2009) and 
Javorcik and Wei (2009) that evidence that high technological firms prefer high equity modes 
in order to protect their intangible assets. 
Table 1: MNCs’ entry mode and corruption: logistic estimates (dependent variable: log odds of FDI vs 
Non-equity) 
Determinants  Proxy  Model I  Model II 
R&D intensity  R&D to sales ratio  1.194
*  0.928 
Firm’s size  Number of employees (ln)  0.566
***  0.333
** 
Number years experience in 




ownership  International 
experience  Number of countries in which the firm is 
present (ln)  -1.074




Openness of the 
host economy  (Exports+Imports)/GDP (ln)  17.729
**  18.517
** 





location  Cultural proximity 
Proportion of firms that stated that linguistic 
and historical ties between home and host 
country were important or very important in 
the decision to enter the market 
0.302  0.354 
Legal Restrictions 
Proportion of firms that stated that the entry 
mode choice was quite influenced by legal 




Political stability   Governance Quality - Worldwide Governance 




Corruption  Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI)/Transparency index (ln)  11.242
**  11.487
** 
    Constant  12.126
*  12.106
* 
  Number of observations (N)  334  334 
  FDI  89  89 
  Non-equity  245  245 
  Goodness of fit     
  Hosmer and Lameshow Test (p-value)  2.202 (0.974)  7.321 (0.502) 




*] statistically significant at 1%(5%)[10%]; N=334=no. of firms (147)*no. of markets.  
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Quite unexpectedly, and in contrast to the extant literature (Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998; 
Chiao et al., 2010), the international experience of Portuguese MNC is negatively related with 
the (log odds of) FDI ‘propensity’, meaning that firms with higher international experience 
tend to enter into PALOP markets mainly by exports. This might be, as Slangen and van 
Tulder (2009) describe in their study, due to the fact that MNCs tend to enter new markets by 
the same method/way they have entered earlier into other markets - i.e. when a firm has 
experience in entering markets via export it is more likely that subsequent internationalization 
processes will take the same path. 
Also in contrast to some of the extant literature (e.g., Javorcik and Wei, 2009) where the 
economy’s openness does not appear to have a statistically significant effect on the entry 
mode choice, in this study the country’s openness indicator emerges as quite relevant for our 
sample of firms. The estimate coefficient of the openness of the market, which stands, as a 
proxy for the host countries reception of trade and commerce, evidence that, on average, all 
the other factors remaining constant, markets which are relatively more open, reflecting lower 
transaction costs, tend to be associated with FDI modes of entry. 
The location dimension received middle support from our data. Indeed, on the one side, the 
size of the market, proxy by the GDP per capita of the host country, emerged as negatively 
and  significantly  related  with  FDI  propensity.  This  suggests  that,  on  average,  Portuguese 
MNC that entry in larger markets tend to resort to non equity modes (namely exports). Such 
results are in disparity with the extant literature (Horstmann and Markusen, 1996; Eicher and 
Kang, 2005), which in general claim that the larger the market size the higher the probability 
of entering via high equity modes. On the other side, and although, as earlier suggested by the 
non parametric test to the differences in means, firms that choose FDI as entry mode tend to 
attribute  higher  scores  to  cultural  proximity,  the  multivariate  estimations  failed  to  give 
relevance  to  this  determinant  (a  similar  result  nevertheless  obtained  by  Demirbag  et  al., 
2009).  This  might  in  part  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  bulk  (almost  90%)  of  our 
respondents considers the historical and linguistic linkages as important factors in the entry 
mode choice.  
The  estimations  reproduced  here  highlight  the  crucial  role  of  institutional  factors  in  the 
explanation of MNCs entry modes. Indeed, legal restrictions, political stability (Model II), 
and utmost the level of corruption of the host country are statistically significantly related 
with  MNC  entry  mode  choices.  In  concrete,  the  Portuguese  MNCs  that  perceive  legal 
restrictions as very important for the choices regarding the entry mode in PALOP tend, on  
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average, to have a higher propensity for FDI entry modes. Moreover, the estimate for the 
corruption variable is positive meaning that, controlling for all the other factors which are 
likely to affect MNC entry mode choices, Portuguese MNCs tend to opt for directly investing 
in the less corrupted (more transparent) markets, as reflected by an higher value of CPI. This 
confirms  the  general  tendency  of  the  extant  literature  (e.g.,  Rodriguez  et  al.,  2005; 
Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Straub, 2007; Paul and Wooster, 2008) which contents that in corrupt 
contexts it would be expected that MNC would prefer non equity entry modes. In this sense, 
our findings do not support Demirbag et al.’s (2010) thesis who underline that despite the 
(high) levels of corruption of host countries close historical and cultural links would push 
firms into equity entry modes.  
5. Conclusions 
The present paper intended to analyze how Portuguese MNC’s choice of the adequate entry 
mode is affected by the extent of corruption in host countries, namely in those from PALOP.  
Africa  has becoming  the  new  frontier  for  emerging  market  investors  (Santiso,  2007).  An 
analysis by The Economist (2011) finds that over the decade, no fewer than six of the world’s 
ten fastest-growing  economies were in sub-Saharan Africa, including Angola on  first and 
Mozambique  on  eighth  place  of  the  ranking.  This  evolution  of  former  under-developed 
markets leads foreign investors to find it increasingly difficult to ignore these markets, despite 
its  -  justified  -  reputation  as  a  tough  place  for  business  because  of  political  uncertainty, 
corruption, weak infrastructure and inconsistent regulation (The Economist, 2010). 
The growing attractiveness of the region allied to strong cultural and historical ties between 
home and host countries tend to, according to some recent studies (e.g., Demirbag et al., 
2010), lead to a higher FDI propensity despite the existence of corruption.  
Aiming  at  testing  the  role  of  corruption  on  firms’ entry  mode  choices  in  contexts  where 
substantial  historical  and  cultural  linkages  exist,  we  focused  our  analysis  on  Portuguese 
MNCs that invest in the PALOP, a set of countries characterized by very high (e.g., Guinea-
Bissau, and Angola), high (e.g., Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe) and middle (e.g., Cape 
Verde) levels of corruption (Transparency International, 2009). In this vein, we constructed 
and implemented a direct questionnaire to 562 Portuguese firms that internationalized to the 
PALOP, from which we obtained 147 responses representing 334 firm-market observations.  
Based on multivariate econometric model, our results show that more innovative firms tend, 
on average, to choose FDI as their adequate entry mode in the selected markets, which is in  
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line with some earlier studies by Sun (1999), Chung (2009) and Javorcik and Wei (2009). 
This might be explained by the fact that high technological firms want to maintain higher 
control over their firm-specific assets (Sreenivas and Pangarkar, 2000; Chen and Hu, 2002). 
Moreover, we found that larger firms have a preference for high equity entry modes, which 
contrast with the study of Esperança et al. (2006), and might be explained by the analysis of 
distinct  host  countries.  While  Esperança  et  al.  (2006)  focus  on  Portuguese  MNCs  which 
invest in Spain, our study analyzes firms from the same home country but internationalizing 
to emerging African countries which present very distinct characteristics, namely the levels of 
corruption, political restrictions and economic and political instability. These and other factors 
as the physical proximity may be the reason why the results point into different directions. 
Additionally, we found that the openness of the host market favors the entry via FDI, what is 
somehow surprising, as this determinant did not appear to have a statistically significant effect 
in previous studies focusing on other (central and eastern European) emergent markets, such 
as the one of Javorcik and Wei (2009). Also in contrast with extant literature (e.g., Horstmann 
and Markusen, 1996), the host market size emerged as negatively related to the equity mode 
propensity, being more likely a (Portuguese) MNC to enter via exports in larger (PALOP) 
markets. Finally, we found that international experience is not associated to, as one would 
expect, high equity modes. This might be, as Slangen and van Tulder (2009) describe in their 
study, due to the fact that MNCs tend to enter new markets by the same method/way they 
have entered earlier into other markets - i.e. firms that are experienced in entering markets via 
export are more likely to follow the same path in subsequent internationalization processes.  
In line with prior studies that point to a preference by firms for non-equity modes when 
entering corrupt markets (e.g., Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Straub, 2007; 
Paul and Wooster, 2008), our results evidence that, on average, Portuguese firms opt for non-
equity modes, most specifically exports, when entering in more corrupted countries. Recall 
that  according  to  Uhlenbruck  et  al.  (2006)  MNCs  use  non-equity  modes  as  an  adaptive 
strategy because this entry mode provides an opportunity to participate in economies where 
corruption is high while avoiding some of the costs related to corruption. Non-equity modes 
also protect the MNCs avoiding the direct contact with corruptive practices such as bribe 
paying (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Beyond the bribes and extra taxes, the direct establishment in 
a  corrupt  market  may  affect  MNCs’  investment  through  its  interaction  with  corrupt  state 
officials. This increases the risk of expropriation reducing the informational advantage a FDI 
entering firm has (Straub, 2007).  
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Based  on  these  results  we  failed  to  corroborate  Demirbag  et  al.’s  (2010)  argumentation. 
Indeed,  despite  the  vast  majority  of  the  firms  (about  90%  of  our  sample)  underlined  the 
importance of cultural ties with PALOP countries, perceived corruption emerged negatively 
and  significantly  correlated  with  the  FDI  propensity.  In  other  words,  PALOP  countries 
characterized by lower perceived corruption tend to be most successful in attracting foreign 
direct  investment.  Thus,  we  demonstrate  that  in  PALOP  too,  high  levels  of  institutional 
quality tend to foster economic growth and development through its positive effects on FDI 
attraction.  
Summing up, our findings highlight that despite the existence of strong cultural ties between 
home  (Portugal)  and  host  countries  (PALOP),  corruption  stands  as  a  critical  obstacle  to 
foreign direct investment. Recall that excluding Cape Verde, all the other PALOP present 
very  low  levels  of  transparency  (with  CPI  below  3  out  a  maximum  of  10).  Given  the 
widespread  perceived  corruption  among  PALOP  our  findings  reflect  a  quite  worrisome 
scenario for future growth prospect of these countries.  
Our study clearly emphasizes that historical and cultural ties are not sufficient for overcoming 
the costs of institutional weaknesses, namely the widespread perceived corruption. We borrow 
Lawal’s (2007) words when she sustains that corruption has been an impediment for the true 
and real development of African society. So, in order to benefit from the potential of foreign 
capital which contributes to economic development and integration with the global economy 
(Shrestha et al., 2010), African countries in general, and the PALOP in particular, should 
implement  serious  measures  to  combat  corruption,  building  a  strong  political  system  that 
inspires confidence and captures foreign investors. 
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